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Flipping the Light Switch: New Perspectives on
Default to Donation for Organs and Tissues
Daniel G. Orenstein* and Layne M. Bettini**
I. INTRODUCTION
Lights on or lights off? This simple decision is the first, basic question
when entering a room. The decision depends on personal preferences and
the circumstances, but the initial position of the light switch does not direct-
ly affect the choice. If the switch is "Off," one can move it to "On." If it is
"On," one can leave it be, and so on and so forth. Keeping lights off when
out of a room is environmentally and financially beneficial, and advocates
encourage doing so for both the direct impact and the secondary effects of
encouraging consideration of energy consumption.' Keeping the switch
"Off" is a simple illustration of a beneficial default, but the principle applies
to more important and complex decisions, as well.
Organ and tissue donation is also a dichotomous choice: consent or de-
cline. In the U.S., forty-two percent of adults are registered as donors.2 Oth-
ers have noted their support or objection in legal documents (e.g., advanced
directives) or expressed them to family members. For those who have made
an express decision, the type of consent system in place makes little practi-
cal difference.3 However, public opinion data indicate that over ninety-five
* J.D., Fellow and Adjunct Professor of Law, Public Health Law and Policy Program,
Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at Arizona State University; Deputy Director, Net-
work for Public Health Law-Western Region; Lincoln Fellow for Ethics and Health Policy,
Arizona State University Lincoln Center for Applied Ethics. The author was employed by
the Donor Network of Arizona in the organ and tissue transplantation field from 2005-08.
The views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not represent the official po-
sition of any organization or institution.
** J.D./M.D. Candidate, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at Arizona State Uni-
versity and Mayo Medical School.
1. See generally Tufts Climate Initiative, Climate change is real ...... turn off your
lights!, http://sustainability.tufts.edu/wp-content/uploads/lightingbrochure.pdf (last visited
May 22, 2014).
2. DONATE LIFE AM., NAT'L DONOR DESIGNATION REPORT CARD: THE CHALLENGE TO
REGISTER MORE ORGAN, EYE AND TISSUE DONORS 7 (2013), available at
http://donatelife.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/DLA-Report-Card-39146-FINAL-
2013.pdf.
3. Emotionally, there may be important distinctions, as discussed infra. This is not to
say that the consent system makes no difference, as evidenced by the failure to recover po-
tential donors who are registered or otherwise specifically indicate willingness to donate be-
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percent of Americans support donation.4 This suggests that a large portion
of the population that has not registered yet may wish to be donors. When
unregistered individuals die, their families are responsible for donation de-
cisions. Here the consent system matters a great deal. The difference be-
tween "opt-in" and "opt-out" approaches may dramatically impact decisions
made by family members suddenly thrust into decision-making roles during
the grieving process.
Considerable scholarly work has analyzed the potential impact of pre-
sumed consent on the availability of organs for transplant,s the prior limited
use of presumed consent in the U.S., 6 and ongoing debates over the auton-
omy interests of decedents and their families. However, at least two other
potential benefits of presumed consent have to date received less attention:
the impact on eye and tissue donation, and improvements for donor fami-
lies. Both serve the same larger goal: a more open, more effective donation
system that improves the public's health.
Presumed consent is a hard policy choice. It is a nudge, in the public
health vernacular, but decidedly a hard nudge-perhaps even a shove.' Pub-
lic health interests often require hard policy decisions. Presumed consent is
not about eliminating personal choice, but rather committing to changing
prevailing cultural norms. The existing opt-in system marginalizes donation
as the exception, when public health needs indicate that it must instead be
the norm. The U.S. continues to suffer from a serious shortage of organ and
tissue donors.9 If presumed consent can improve procurement rates directly
or indirectly, or can improve the process for donor families, it is worthy of
serious consideration.
This article explores the potential positive effects of a presumed consent
system. Part II discusses presumed consent from a public health perspective
cause family members have not been reached or have refused consent. See generally Leon-
ard H. Bucklin, Woe Unto Those Who Request Consent: Ethical and Legal Considerations in
Rejecting a Deceased's Anatomical Gift Because There is No Consent by the Survivors, 78
N.D. L. REV. 323 (2002).
4. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVs., HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., 2012
NATIONAL SURVEY OF ORGAN DONATION ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS 1 (2013), available at
http://organdonor.gov/dtcp/nationalsurveyorgandonation.pdf.
5. E.g., Amber Rithalia et al., Impact of Presumed Consent for Organ Donation on Do-
nation Rates: A Systematic Review, 338 BMJ 284, 285-87 (2009).
6. E.g., David Orentlicher, Presumed Consent to Organ Donation: Its Rise and Fall in
the United States, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 295, 300-02 (2008).
7. E.g., Kyle Powys Whyte et al., Nudge, Nudge or Shove, Shove-The Right Way for
Nudges to Increase the Supply of Donated Cadaver Organs, 12 AM. J. BIOETHICs 32, 34
(2012); Joseph L. Verheijde et al., Recovery of transplantable organs after cardiac or circu-
latory death: Transforming the paradigm for the ethics of organ donation, 2 PHIL. ETHICS &
HUMAN. MED. 8 (2007); Bucklin, supra note 3, at 348.
8. See Whyte et al., supra note 7, at 35.
9. Donate Life Am., Understanding Donation, http://donatelife.net/understanding-
donation/ (last visited May 22, 2014).
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and addresses several common arguments against adopting presumed con-
sent. Part III examines the possible impact of presumed consent on eye and
tissue donation, including procurement rates and other aspects of the field.
Part IV analyzes the positive effects presumed consent may have on donor
families and resulting secondary effects on views of donation.
II. PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRESUMED CONSENT
The current U.S. approach to donation is an opt-in system that relies on
individuals registering as donors.o Under this regime, for individuals
whose wishes are unknown at death, decision-making falls to next of kin.
Because actual consent is required, the default is non-consent.12 Presumed
consent reverses the process, requiring those individuals opposed to dona-
tion to register their objection, thus transforming the process by making do-
nation the default rule rather than the exception. Presumed consent faces
significant opposition on the basis of core bioethical principles.13 Ultimate-
ly, however, presumed consent is less dramatically different from the exist-
ing system than initial appearances might suggest, and it may yield signifi-
cant public health benefits.
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), revised most recently in
142009 and adopted by the vast majority of states, grants authority for per-
sons to donate bodily tissue after death.15 The UAGA and state implement-
ing legislation16 strongly emphasize donor autonomy. Persons may register
consent to donate directly via a donor registry or may state their wishes in
10. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, which articulates an opt-in regime, has been
adapted in forty-six states and the District of Columbia, and has been proposed in Pennsyl-
vania in 2014. Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Anatomical Gift Act
(2006), http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical%20Gift%2OAct%20(2006).
11. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 9 (amended 2009), 8A U.L.A. 49 (Supp. 2013).
12. See §8, 8AU.L.A.49.
13. See Presidential Comm'n for the Study of Bioethical Issues, Informed Consent
Background (updated Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/Informed
%20Consent%20Background%20090413.pdf (discussing the importance of informed con-
sent as an ethical principle in biomedical and other human subject research).
14. Anatomical Gift Act (2006), supra note 10.
15. Some differences between organ, eye, and tissue donation (collectively "donation")
are discussed infra Section III.
16. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-841-36-864 (West, WestlawNext through legis-
lation effective April 30, 2014 of the Second Regular Session of the Fifty-first Legislature);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7150-7151.40 (West, WestlawNext through Ch. 13 of
2014 Reg.Sess. and all propositions on the 6/3/2014 ballot.); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.510-
765.547 (West, WestlawNext through 2014 2nd Reg. Sess. of the 23rd Legislature through
March 31, 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 525A.01-525A.25 (West, WestlawNext through
2014 Regular Session through Chapter 166, except Chapters 149, 152, 157, 161, and 164);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 692A.001-692A.023 (West, WestlawNext through
the end of the 2013 Third Called Session of the 83rd Legislature).
3 2014
3
Orenstein and Bettini: Flipping the Light Switch: New Perspectives on Default to Donatio
Published by LAW eCommons, 2014
Annals of Health Law
various legal documents, such as advanced directives or wills. 1 In most ju-
risdictions, donors may register at their local motor vehicle division and
have a designation placed on their driver's licenses." If a decedent has nei-
ther registered nor explicitly objected to donation, consent decisions fall to
next of kin.19
20No monetary or other incentives are permitted in exchange for consent,
so consent is presently sought on the basis of altruism, commonly invoked
as seeking the "gift of life." 21 This mild encouragement sometimes works
surprisingly well. In some states, over eighty percent of adults are registered
donors,22 though the national average designating donor status is just forty-
two percent.23 In 2012, over forty percent of actual donors were registered,
the rest becoming donors based on next of kin consent.24 The consent rate
from family members is generally less than sixty percent under the best of
circumstances, and far lower when the process does not follow a collabora-
tive process that brings together healthcare staff and procurement organiza-
-25tions.
The underlying assumption of the opt-in consent approach is that those
who do not consent during life or express such wishes to family members
26do not wish to be donors. While there may be no formal presumption of
objection under an opt-in system, there is an implicit barrier created in that
17. U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs., Health Res. & Servs. Admin., Becoming a Do-
nor, http://organdonor.govlbecomingdonor/index.html (last visited May 22, 2014).
18. Id.
19. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 9 (amended 2009), 8A U.L.A. 49 (Supp. 2013) (re-
quiring the authority to consent on behalf of a decedent to follow an explicit order of priority
with ten categories of persons. In order of priority: 1) legal agent of the decedent; 2) spouse;
3) adult children; 4) parents; 5) adult siblings; 6) adult grandchildren; 7) grandparents; 8)
adults who exhibited special care and concern for the decedent; 9) persons acting as guardi-
ans; and 10) other persons authorized to dispose of the decedent's body).
20. But see Muireann Quigley et al., Organ Donation and Priority Points in Israel: An
Ethical Analysis, 93 TRANSPLANTATION 970, 971 (2012) (contrasting with Israeli policy,
granting registered donors priority to receive transplants if needed during life).
21. E.g., N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Take Action, http://www.donatelifeny.org/take-
action/register-to-become-a-donor (last visited May 22, 2014) ("Enrollment in the New York
State Donate Life Registry ... legally empowers you to save lives-no one can reverse your
decision to give the gift of life when you add your name to the database.").
22. DONATE LIFE AM., supra note 2, at 6. In Montana, eighty-two percent of the adult
population is registered as of 2013. Id.
23. Id. at 4.
24. Id. at 1 (noting forty-one percent of recovered organ donors, forty-six percent of
recovered tissue donors, and fifty percent of recovered eye donors were registered).
25. Laura A. Siminoff et al., Factors Influencing Families' Consent for Donation of
Solid Organs for Transplantation, 280 JAMA 71, 72-73 (2001).
26. But see DAVID PRICE, HUMAN TISSUE IN TRANSPLANTATION AND RESEARCH: A
MODEL LEGAL AND ETHICAL FRAMEWORK 134-35 (2010) (arguing that allowing family mem-
ber consent after death indicates that there is in fact no presumption of objection on the part
of the decedent).
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a family member might reasonably think, "If my loved one wished to do-
nate, she would have registered." 27 In contrast, several other nations use an
opt-out system, also known as "presumed consent" or "default to dona-
tion."28 In such systems, donation may occur unless the decedent or next of
kin expressly object.29 Under this model, the underlying assumption is thus
reversed: those who do not explicitly decline or make such wishes known to
family members do not oppose donation.30 As discussed in Part IV, infra,
presumed consent facilitates the opposite thought, "If my loved one did not
wish to donate, she would have opted out." 31
In order to respect decedents' wishes, a key provision of the 2006 UAGA
provides that consent registered by the decedent is not revocable by next of
kin unless the decedent expressly indicated a subsequent objection to dona-
tion.32 This legally authorizes procurement from a registered donor without
family approval.33 In practice, however, procurement organizations almost
always consult family members.34 In a number of cases, the family either
refuses to participate or explicitly denies consent.35 While the procurement
organization could legally proceed with the donation in such cases, they
rarely do so out of respect for the family's wishes and concern for public
perception of donation. On occasion, donation does proceed, which often
results in a legal and public relations quagmire.36
The existing system already presumes that willingness to donate outpac-
27. See id. at 135.
28. Amanda M. Rosenblum et al., The Authority of Next-of-Kin in Explicit and Pre-
sumed Consent Organ Donation: An Analysis of 54 Nations, 27 NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS
TRANSPLANTATION 2533, 2533 (2012).
29. Id. at 2541.
30. See id. at 2533.
31. See Orentlicher, supra note 6, at 300. Some U.S. states formerly used a form of lim-
ited presumed consent, such as for deaths under medical examiner jurisdiction, but generally
now follow the opt-in approach of the 2006 UAGA. Id.
32. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8(a) (amended 2009), 8A U.L.A. 49 (Supp. 2013)
("[I]n the absence of an express, contrary indication by the donor, a person other than the
donor is barred from making, amending, or revoking an anatomical gift of a donor's body or
part if the donor made an anatomical gift of the donor's body or part under Section 5 or an
amendment to an anatomical gift of the donor's body or part under Section 6."). This lan-
guage firmly protects the wishes of the decedent, even if contrary to those of family mem-
bers, and is even stronger in this regard than prior language from the 1987 UAGA. See UNIF.
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(h) (1987), 8A U.L.A. 2 (Supp. 1988) ("An anatomical gift that is
not revoked by the donor before death is irrevocable and does not require the consent or con-
currence of any person after the donor's death.").
33. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8(a) (amended 2009), 8A U.L.A. 49 (Supp. 2013).
34. See Rosenblum, supra note 28, at 2541.
35. Siminoff, supra note 25, at 71.
36. See, e.g., Allison Manning, Family Loses Fight to Keep Son's Organ from Dona-
tion, COLUMBUs DISPATCH (July 12, 2013, 9:05 AM), http://www.dispatch.com
/content/stories/ocal/2013/07/1 1/Judge-ordered-family-to-let-brain-dead-son-donate-
organs.html.
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es donor registration.3 Millions of Americans are registered, but less than
half of procurements come from this group.38 Health care, medical examin-
er, and funeral home staff routinely refer deaths to procurement organiza-
tions or approach family members for donation consent themselves.3 9 Most
hospitals are obligated to refer deaths and imminent deaths to procurement
organizations.40 Approaching family members when a decedent was unreg-
istered recognizes that many still wished to be donors. By extension, it also
assumes that those who objected would have expressed this; otherwise ap-
proaching the family would inappropriately circumvent the decedent's
wishes. In this light, a presumed consent system is more similar from exist-
ing practices than may appear at first glance.
A "soft" presumed consent system, as used in a considerable majority of
presumed consent countries, permits next of kin to override the presumption
41
of consent even if the decedent did not register any objection. In a "hard"
presumed consent system, as used in countries like Belgium and Sweden,
only the decedent's formal objection can override the presumption-family
members have no legal authority to do so, even if they produce evidence
that the decedent actually opposed donation.42
Soft presumed consent retains a significant role for donor families. This
is more similar to the existing U.S. system and represents a better approach.
Failures of previous presumed consent regimes in the U.S. appear to be the
direct result of woefully inadequate communication with donor families,
and such mistakes should not be repeated.43 Appropriate and significant
contact between procurement staff and families impacts how families view
donation and is associated with higher consent rates under the existing sys-
tem.44 Such contact is equally important under a presumed consent system.
37. See DONATE LiFE Am., supra note 2, at 5-8 (indicating that in 2012 there was a for-
ty-two percent Donor Designation Rate, yet seventy-six percent of adults willing to donate
believe they are registered to be organ or tissue donors).
38. Id. at 1 (noting that registered donors account for forty-one percent of organ donors,
forty-six percent of tissue donors, and fifty percent of eye donors).
39. Donate Life Am., Tissue Donation, http://donatelife.net/understanding-donation/
tissue-donation/ (last visited May 22, 2014).
40. 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.45, 485.643 (West, WestlawNext through May 15, 2014; 79 Fed.
Reg. 27,771).
41. See Rosenblum, supra note 28, at 2542. Some notable adopters of soft presumed
consent include: Armenia, Austria, Belarus, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Ecuador, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Paraguay, Slovenia, Spain, Tunisia,
and Turkey. Id.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002) (concerning
parents who brought suit following procurement of their child's comeas after death without
notice to them); see also Orentlicher, supra note 6, at 305-08 (describing two cases involving
absence of notice to family members of organ retrieval from deceased patients).
44. See Siminoff, supra note 25, at 76-77.
Vol. 23 6
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Presumed consent should not alter efforts to encourage individuals to
join donor registries. An individual's stated wishes are preferable to pre-
sumption of any kind. Presumed consent addresses solely those whose
wishes are not known. Personal reflection and family conversations owing
to a policy change to presumed consent may even increase registry partici-
pation by emphasizing the importance of affirmatively stating one's prefer-
ences. When an individual explicitly consents or rejects donation, that deci-
sion should receive firm legal support.
Some question whether presumed consent plays too much into the inac-
curate but long-standing public fears that medical professionals may pro-
vide lesser care to individuals in instances where organs could be recov-
ered.45 The transplantation community has worked for decades to counter
such misperceptions. 46 Although such erroneous beliefs are difficult to
purge, presumed consent could actually lessen, rather than exacerbate, these
concerns. In fact, a larger pool of potential donors should provide less rea-
son to worry about unethical actions based on organ scarcity.4
Many may object to presumed consent on the basis that it is inconsistent
with general principles of informed consent in health care. The right of
competent adults to refuse unwanted medical treatment is well-
established. 48 However, a more apt analogy is the unconscious emergency
room patient, who, like a decedent, cannot express their wishes. Such pa-
tients are usually treated aggressively, on the premise that most individuals
would desire this if given the choice.49 According to opinion data, donation
is also the majority choice by a wide margin.50 There are distinctions, of
course, including emergency room care being intended to save or improve
the patient's life; yet this, too, has a conceptual analogue in donation. Noth-
ing more can be done for the donor, but donation can save and enhance the
45. E.g., Kieran Healy, Why Revive Old Fears?, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2010,
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/should-laws-encourage-organ-
donation/? r=0. (arguing that advocating for presumed consent could raise fear among pa-
tients and their next of kin that quality of care will lessen in order to favor organ procure-
ment).
46. See Gift of Life Donor Program, Busting Myths About Organ Donation,
http://www.donors1.org/learn2/myths/ (last visited May 22, 2014) (explaining that medical
professionals prioritize saving a patient's life before any consideration of potential organ
procurement).
47. See Orentlicher, supra note 6, at 322-24 (explaining arguments both for and against
the proposition that more donors will alleviate potentially unethical action by physicians).
48. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) ("The principle
that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.").
49. John C. Moskop, Information Disclosure and Consent: Patient Preferences and
Provider Responsibilities, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICs 47, 47 (2007).
50. Sara Krieger, Incentivizing Organ Donation: A Proposal to End the Organ Short-
age, 38 HOFSTRA L. REv. 757, 759 (2009).
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lives of organ and tissue recipients. Those who desire less aggressive or
non-standard care in the emergency room-e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses, per-
sons with Do Not Resuscitate orders-generally have the burden to express
these wishes. Similarly, those who object to donation have every right to
do so, but may reasonably be made responsible for recording their objec-
tions, rather than imposing decision-making on family members.
Individual autonomy is a core value of bioethics, and debates over proper
protection of this interest in donation are extensive. Many scholars argue
that presumed consent threatens autonomy, noting that it is a marked break
from the informed consent generally required for medical procedures. 52
This is only one of the various ethical concerns raised by proposals for pre-
sumed consent for donation>.5 However, others persuasively argue that the
existing opt-in system can equally violate autonomy by failing to procure
organs and tissues from those who wish to donate but whose wishes were
54
not known. While these debates continue, it is critically important to en-
51. Do not resuscitate orders, MEDLINEPLUS (updated Apr. 7, 2014),
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/patientinstructions/000473.htm ("If you DO want
to receive CPR, you don't have to do anything. If you do NOT want CPR, talk with your
doctor about a DNR order."); Douglas R. Migden & G. Richard Braen, The Jehovah's Wit-
ness Blood Refusal Card: Ethical and Medicolegal Considerations for Emergency Physi-
cians, 5 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 815, 815 (1998) ("It is general practice for adult Witnesses
to carry on their person a wallet-sized advance directive card refusing blood."); Nayna
Philipsen et al., Surrogate Decision-Making: How to Promote Best Outcomes in Difficult
Times, 9 J. NURSE PRACTITIONERS 581, 583 (2013).
52. See, e.g., Maryellen Liddy, The New "Body Snatchers": Analyzing the Effect of
Presumed Consent Organ Donation Laws on Privacy, Autonomy, and Liberty, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 815, 852 (2001) (arguing that presumed consent is not necessary due to adequate
available alternatives); Alexander Powhida, Forced Organ Donation: The Presumed Con-
sent to Organ Donation Laws of the Various States and the United States Constitution, 9
ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 349, 353-54 (1999) (asserting that presumed consent laws in many
states will likely be found unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause).
53. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 6, at 317-20 (explaining the ethical differences
between the risks of mistakenly taking an organ from an actually unwilling individual based
on presumed consent compared to mistakenly not taking an organ from an actually willing
person); Marie-Andr6e Jacob, Another Look at the Presumed-Versus-Informed Consent Di-
chotomy in Postmortem Organ Procurement, 20 BIOETHICs 293, 297-98 (2006) (emphasiz-
ing the potential burden on vulnerable populations and arguing that default rules should run
counter to the position of the stronger party in consent decisions, specifically against the
government in the case of donation). In light of significant differences in consent rates across
racial/ethnic lines, any change to a presumed consent structure must also include specific
outreach to inform minority populations of changes to consent rules to avoid unduly burden-
ing individual autonomy among individuals in these groups.
54. Orentlicher, supra note 6, at 313-16 (discussing the risks involved with presumed
and actual consent for both patients that wanted to donate and those that did not). Instances
of family members overriding the wishes of registered donors by refusing consent is a sepa-
rate but important issue that is not addressed here. See generally Bucklin, supra note 3 (de-
scribing the legal and ethical implications resulting from allowing next of kin to block con-
sent). There are a variety of other issues at stake, as well, including the impact of various
8
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sure proper education and assistance to enable all individuals to make
choices consistent with their wishes.
At the same time, organ and tissue donation is more than a health care is-
sue: it is a public health issue. Favoring an outcome that benefits the pub-
lic's health despite minimal intrusion on individual autonomy is consistent
with established norms of public health ethics, provided that autonomy re-
ceives proper consideration and protection and there is no intentional harm
to individual interests. 5
Presumed consent does have an inescapable paternalistic character. Opt-
ing out carries no repercussions, but making consent the default choice is a
nudge toward a specific course of action. Choosing not to donate may result
in harm to others (e.g., those awaiting a transplant who may not receive
one), arguably inviting the harm principle56 as an ethical justification. How-
ever, this argument is unlikely to overcome the self-regarding nature of con-
trol of one's own body, even after death. As a result, a legitimate justifica-
tion of presumed consent must embrace its paternalistic qualities, even if
mild compared to other public health interventions.
Though deserving significant deference and protection, individual auton-
omy is not an inviolable principle. From a public health ethics standpoint,
proper balancing of individual autonomy interests against public health
goals permits at least some degree of non-coercive paternalism, even for
wholly self-regarding behavior. The encroachment on individual autono-
my in presumed consent is minimal, and the public health need is great.
There must be a default rule-either consent or non-consent. The govern-
ment has the authority to choose the one that encourages behavior that is
beneficial to public health. The current system, in some respects, discour-
ages donation by making it the exception, rather than the rule.
The modern mantra of public health advocates has been "Making the
Healthy Choice the Easy Choice."58 Public health policy can leverage de-
fault options for the benefit of individual and public good without unduly
compromising free choice.59 These policies can and should strive to make
systems on vulnerable populations. E.g., Jacob, supra note 53 (discussing the pressure and
risks of exploitation for vulnerable populations in donation consent).
55. See LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 43 (2d
ed. 2008).
56. See id. at 47-49 (explaining harm principle as an ethical basis for public health in-
tervention).
57. See, e.g., James F. Childress et al., Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 170, 171-72, 175-76 (2002).
58. E.g., Harvard Sch. of Pub. Health, Obesity Prevention Source: Making Healthy
Choices Easy Choices, http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/obesity-prevention-source/policy-and-
environmental-change (last visited May 22, 2014).
59. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THAYER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4-8 (2008).
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the choices that positively impact health the default choices, particularly
where they do not infringe on individual autonomy. More commonly, this
approach applies to self-concerning behavioral choices with public health
implications (e.g., diet).60 However, the message can also apply to individu-
al decisions that impact the health of others, as is true of organ and tissue
donation.
Public health already takes this approach to some health care decisions
that impact the health of others, such as childhood immunization. 1 Parents
may forego vaccinating their children, but must take explicit action to do so
62because the legal default is immunization. While all states permit exemp-
tion for medical reasons, and nearly all do so for religious beliefs, less than
half allow exemption for reasons of conscience, generally.63 Though such a
mandate undoubtedly infringes on individual autonomy, the serious threat
of communicable disease justifies the approach, and states have ample pub-
64lic health legal authority under their police powers. A presumed consent
donation system is a far lighter touch that is also justified by prevailing pub-
lic health interests.
With respect to issues of autonomy and parental rights, it should be noted
that presumed consent should not apply to minors. Minors lack legal ca-
65pacity to make many medical decisions, and their actual donation consent
60. Obesity Prevention Source: Making Healthy Choices Easy Choices, supra note 58.
61. James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence 0. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: His-
torical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 Ky. L.J. 831, 857-58 (2002) ("Despite the manda-
tory nature of compulsory school vaccination laws, the state's power to require children to
be vaccinated as a condition of school entrance has been widely accepted and judicially
sanctioned."). See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2164 (McKinney, WestlawNext through
L.2014, chapters I to 22, 50 to 60).
62. See, e.g., 25 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 97.62 (West, WestlawNext through 39 Tex.Reg.
No. 3512, dated April 25, 2014, as effective on or before April 29, 2014) ("To claim an ex-
clusion for reasons of conscience, including a religious belief, a signed affidavit must be pre-
sented by the child's parent or legal guardian, stating that the child's parent or legal guardian
declines vaccinations for reasons of conscience, including because of the person's religious
beliefs.").
63. Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, States with Religious and Philosophical Ex-
emptions from School Immunization Requirements (Dec. 2012), http://www.ncsl.org
/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx.
64. See Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905) (finding that individual liberty inter-
ests do not outweigh the authority of states under their police powers to protect community
health against epidemic disease through mandatory vaccination).
65. Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Decisional Autonomy for Medical Care: Physi-
cian Perceptions and Practices, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 87, 91 (2001) ("Legal treat-
ment of adolescent autonomy for medical decision making is based on a presumption of de-
cisional incapacity."). Minors have at least some authority to make decisions in certain
medical matters, particularly related to testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseas-
es, but their consent authority is generally considered limited. See B. Jessie Hill, Medical
Decision Making By and On Behalf of Adolescents: Reconsidering First Principles, 15 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 37, 41-43 (2012). However, the legal landscape regarding minors'
medical decision-making capacity is a complicated one, and even the common assumption
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66
would be ineffectual if contrary to parental wishes, making presumed con-
sent demonstrably inappropriate. Additionally, like other next of kin who
may provide consent, parents may have limited due process and quasi-
property rights regarding the bodies of their children.6 Such rights would
likely be stronger for parents than other next of kin.6' The complexity of is-
sues of autonomy regarding minors alters the balance of individual interests
and public health benefit discussed above, necessitating a different ap-
proach that relies exclusively on parental consent. For adults, however, the
public health benefits of presumed consent argue in favor of such an ap-
proach.
III. PRESUMED CONSENT AND EYE AND TISSUE DONATION
Although they share many similarities, there are key differences between
organ transplantation and eye and tissue transplantation. The U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) regulates tissue transplantation, while the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Health Resources and
Services Administration regulates organ transplantation.69 Organs are in
much shorter supply, owing largely to the specific circumstances required
to facilitate procurement.70 As a result, requirements and restrictions are
sometimes more flexible. For example, many decedents who would not be
medically suitable eye or tissue donors may be suitable organ donors.
that minors generally lack legal capacity in this area is not unassailable, at least with respect
to adolescents. Id.
66. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8(g)-(h) (updated 2009), 8A U.L.A. 49 (Supp.
2013).
67. See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding due pro-
cess right in control of child's corneas after death); but see Ga. Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. La-
vant, 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985) (finding no constitutionally protected rights in a decedent's
body that would invalidate a system that failed to provide notice prior to procurement of
child's corneas and noting that any quasi-property rights must bow to the state's public
health authority where exercised reasonably, impartially, and not inconsistently with general
state policy); see also Brendan Abel, Physician Assisted Homicide in Organ Donations After
Cardiac Death: The Failure of Biotechnologies to Comply with the Uniform Definition of
Death Act and the Dead Donor Rule, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 573, 582-83 (2012)
(discussing conflicting judicial treatment of presumed consent under older presumed consent
frameworks). Of note, even if there are property rights in a decedent's organs and tissues, it
is a long-established power of the state to determine how property rights are distributed in
the absence of the known wishes of the decedent. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.
§ 2.1 (1999) (discussing general principles of intestacy).
68. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (establishing substan-
tive due process right of parents to control upbringing and education of children).
69. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Tissue and Tissue Product Questions and Answers (up-
dated Oct., 14, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/TissueTissueProducts/
QuestionsaboutTissues/ucml01559.htm.
70. Ellen Sheehy et al., Estimating the Number ofPotential Organ Donors in the United
States, 349 NEw ENG. J. MED. 667, 671 (2003).
71. Even HIV-positive donors may be acceptable for organ procurement, at least for
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While not as immediately impactful in the life-saving sense, eye and tissue
transplantation is nonetheless of enormous importance. In 2012, there were
over 46,000 corneal transplants and over 1 million tissue transplants per-
formed in the U.S.72
Statistical evidence is mixed regarding whether presumed consent will
significantly increase organ donation rates compared to opt-in approaches.73
However, the impact on eye and tissue donation rates is less studied, and
there is reason to suspect the impact could be more substantial. Generally,
the percentage of viable organ donors recovered is quite high. A number of
factors explain this. Most people are familiar with organ donation and have
generally positive opinions of the transplantation system. Medical facili-
ties routinely refer potential organ donors to procurement organizations and
are usually required to do so. When suitable donors progress to brain
death, organ procurement teams take charge of case management, ensuring
that viability is maintained while arrangements for transplantation into a
waiting recipient are made.
Eye and tissue donation are simpler than organ donation in the practical
sense. Procurement can proceed up to twenty-four hours after death. Cor-
neas are preserved and refrigerated, and they can be transplanted several
transplantation in HIV-positive recipients. See, e.g., Sara Reardon, United States to Allow
Transplants of HIV-Infected Organs, NATURE (Nov. 13, 2013).
72. Donate Life Am., Statistics, http://donatelife.net/understanding-donation/statistics/
(last visited May 22, 2014).
73. Compare Rithalia, supra note 5 (citing donation rate increases as high as thirty per-
cent after introduction of presumed consent), with Brian J. Boyarsky et al., Potential Limita-
tions of Presumed Consent Legislation, 93 TRANSPLANTATION 136 (2012) (discussing con-
founding factors that show presumed consent not functionally increasing donation rates).
74. Felix Cantarovich, An International Opinion Poll of Well-Educated People Regard-
ing Awareness and Feelings About Organ Donation for Transplantation, 20 TRANSPLANT
INT'L 512 (2007); Statistics, supra note 72; Sara K. Kahan, Note, Incentivizing Organ Dona-
tion: A Proposal to End the Organ Shortage, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 757, 759 (2009) (citing
THE GALLUP ORG., 2005 NAT'L SURVEY OF ORGAN & TISSUE DONATION ATTITUDES &
BEHAVIORS 5, 9 (2005)).
75. 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.45, 485.643 (West, WestlawNext through May 15, 2014; 79 Fed.
Reg. 27,771).
76. Ass'n of Organ Procurement Orgs., An Organ Procurement Organization's Role in
the Organ Recovery Process, http://www.aopo.org/userfiles/DonationProcess.pdf (last vis-
ited May 22, 2014).
77. Am. Ass'n of Tissue Banks, Printable Update for Insertion Into Standards D5 400
(Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.aatb.org/index.asp?bid=43 (permitting procurement up to twen-
ty-four hours after asystole if body is adequately cooled within twelve hours after asystole);
EYE BANK Ass'N OF AM., MEDICAL STANDARDS § D1.600 (2011), available at
http://www.restoresight.org/wp-content/uploads/201 1/1 1/Medical-Standards-October-2011
.pdf (allowing variable acceptable time intervals between death and procurement, but rec-
ommending procurement as soon as possible after death); see also Cornea Donation, Donate
Life Am., Cornea Donation, http://donatelife.net/understanding-donation/cornea-donation/
(last visited May 22, 2014) ("Cornea donation usually happens within 12 hours of death.").
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days after removal.78 Tissues can be frozen and held even longer before
transplantation.79 And yet, the percentage of viable eye and tissue donors
recovered is far lower compared to organ donors. While nationally nearly
seventy-three percent of eligible organ donors are recovered, this drops to
less than thirty-two percent for cornea donors.o Fewer people are familiar
with eye and tissue donation, and may not realize they or their family mem-
bers could be donors." The need for corneal tissue was among the primary
82
motivations for early U.S. presumed consent statutes.82 Though these sys-
tems had significant flaws (most dramatically the lack of family notification
and consultation), they were highly effective in increasing the supply of
corneas for transplant.83
Practical concerns may limit the direct impact of presumed consent on
eye and tissue procurement. In addition to ethical issues discussed above,
staffing and other resource limitations may militate in favor of not pursuing
procurement before families have been contacted to provide complete med-
ical and social history, even if procurement might be legally permissible
based on presumed consent. As observed by Professor Orentlicher, among
others, the Eye Bank Association of America did not oppose eliminating
presumed consent in the 2006 revisions to the UAGA, at least in part be-
cause medical and social history requirements negated much of the func-
tionality of presumed consent statutes as they existed at that time.84
Unlike organ procurement, where the procurement team operates in an
environment they control after the process begins, eye and tissue procure-
ment is much more varied and unpredictable. Staff must obtain medical
records from all relevant institutions and other entities involved in care
leading up to death. This may include physicians' offices and hospitals, as
well as other entities, such as first responders (e.g., police and fire depart-
ments). The records are necessary to establish information required to de-
termine transplant, including time of death and medications and fluids ad-
ministered.85 Such records may be transferred to procurement organizations
78. Cornea Donation, supra note 77.
79. Tissue Donation, supra note 39.
80. United Network for Organ Sharing, Reported Eligible Deaths and Recovered De-
ceased Donors 2008-2013 (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.aopo.org/userfiles
/file/DonationData/Reported%20Eligible%20Deaths%20and%20Recovered%20Deceased%
20Donors%202008-December%202013.xlsx (reporting 6487 total recoveries among 8936
eligible deaths for 2012); EYE BANK Ass'N OF AM., 2012 EYE BANKING STATISTICAL REPORT
14 (2013), available at http://www.restoresight.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2012
StatisticalReport FINAL-reduced-size-4-10.pdf.
81. Statistics, supra note 72 ("According to research, ninety-eight percent of all adults
have heard about organ donation and eighty-six percent have heard of tissue donation.").
82. Orentlicher, supra note 6, at 302-03.
83. Id. at 302-05.
84. Id. at 307.
85. Among other elements, a full accounting of medications and fluids is required to
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under a specific exception to the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule. 1 While entities that commonly ex-
change patient records are usually familiar with the applicable rule, others
that do not regularly transfer records or interact with procurement organiza-
tions sometimes resist releasing records, potentially endangering the viabil-
ity of procured tissue, particularly corneas, which remain viable for only a
matter of days.8
In some respects, presumed consent might be more appropriate for eye
and tissue donation than for organ donation. As noted above, one of the
primary objections to presumed consent is the persistent-albeit factually
inaccurate-fear of unethical reduction in care for registered donors in the
interest of "harvesting" their organs. For eye and tissue transplantation,
such concerns should never attach. Organ donors are brain dead-a concept
that still suffers from widespread misunderstanding8 9-but generally have
artificially-maintained heart and lung function, and procurement most often
takes place within the hospital where the patient has just received medical
treatment. Confusion and concern conflating donation and treatment are
mistaken, but conceptually understandable. Eye and tissue donors, however,
have no cardiopulmonary function. No additional medical care is possible.
Procurement usually takes place hours after death, often at a separate facili-
ty, medical examiner's office, or even funeral home. Based on these distinc-
tions, it might be preferable in theory to separate the consent process for
each type of donation, adopting presumed consent for eye and tissue dona-
tion, but maintaining actual consent for organ donation. In practice, howev-
er, this might lend unwarranted credibility to persistent fears about organ
donation practices and unintentionally decrease organ donation consent
rates. Moreover, although rare, abuse in the eye and tissue transplant field is
not unheard of.90 As such, a consistent system across all forms of donation
is the better approach absent future evidence to the contrary.
determine whether a donor's blood has been too diluted to ensure viability of disease testing
("hemodilution"). U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ELIGIBILITY
DETERMINATION FOR DONORS OF HUMAN CELLS, TISSUES, AND CELLULAR AND TISSUE-BASED
PRODUCTS (HCT/Ps) § (V)(F)-(G) (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads
/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/Tissue/uc
m091345.pdf.
86. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(h) (West, WestlawNext through May 15, 2014; 79 Fed. Reg.
27,771).
87. Based on authors' own recollection and experience.
88. Healy, supra note 45.
89. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Legal and Ethical Responsibilities Following Brain
Death: The McMath and Muioz Cases, 311 JAMA 903 (2014); Editorial, Jahi McMath: Ex-
pert Criticizes Keeping Girl on Ventilator, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2014,
http://articles.latimes.com/2014/jan/13/local/1a-me-In-jahi-mcmath-ventilator-20140113.
90. See Michael Powell & David Segal, In New York, a Grisly Traffic in Body Parts
Illegal Sales Worry Dead's Kin, Tissue Recipients, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2006, at A03.
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IV. PRESUMED CONSENT AND DONOR FAMILIES
Many of the best candidates for donation die unexpectedly. Sudden
trauma (e.g., motor vehicle accident or gunshot) or swift disease processes
(e.g., heart attack or stroke) are common causes of death among donors. 91
Even registered donors do not always discuss their decision with family
members. As a result, most decedents' families are in an exceedingly diffi-
cult position when approached regarding donation. In the wake of losing a
close family member, they must make decisions about what the decedent
would have wanted, often with little or no guidance or indication of her
wishes. Family members are understandably prone to applying their own
values to the question, rather than the decedent's. 92 The concept and details
of donation are complex and better understood through personal reflection,
rather than a time-sensitive decision thrust upon grieving relatives. Such
circumstances may put family members at odds with procurement organiza-
tions, as well as other family members. There is an explicit hierarchy of
family members who may provide consent for donation,93 but if family
members hold conflicting beliefs, what begins as a discussion about an al-
truistic "gift of life" can instead produce additional strain for an already be-
reaved family.
Presumed consent absolves decedents' families of many concerns inher-
ent to the current opt-in system. A family can be more confident in their de-
cision to proceed with donation, knowing they are not making a decision
their loved one strongly opposed. Donation registration efforts would con-
tinue, and donation advocates would still encourage registered donors to
discuss their wishes with family members. The key change in presumed
consent is viewing those who say nothing as having no objection to dona-
tion. This allows inclusion of those who support donation but fail to express
those beliefs directly, while respecting the autonomy of those opposed by
providing a simple and effective means to opt out.
Presumed consent removes the current need for family members to pro-
vide consent and shifts the burden from the family to the decedent, who ul-
timately has the greatest interest in her own body. 94 This is consistent with a
91. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Sers., Health Res. & Sers. Admin., Organ Dona-
tion: The Process, http://www.organdonor.gov/about/organdonationprocess.html#process1
(last visited May 22, 2014) ("Most donors are victims of severe head trauma, a brain aneu-
rysm or stroke.").
92. Paula Boddington, Organ Donation After Death Should I Decide, or Should My
Family?, 15 J. APPLIED PHIL. 69, 76 (1998); Orentlicher, supra note 6, at 311-12.
93. See supra note 11, at § 9a(1)-(10).
94. One could argue that this interest terminates at death, but existing legal and ethical
norms generally acknowledge an autonomous interest in bodily integrity that also encom-
passes treatment of one's body and remains after death. Contra Tillman v. Detroit Receiving
Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Mich. App. 1984) (holding that constitutional privacy rights
terminate at death and cannot be invoked by decedents' families or estates in relation to pre-
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bioethical focus on personal autonomy.95 With an appropriate and extensive
public education campaign, potential donors will have the opportunity to
become informed about the new process, allowing them to make an in-
formed decision about opting out if they so choose. The current system
places the information burden on families, who are inundated with infor-
mation about donation almost immediately after a family member's death-
an unnecessary and unwelcome stress. Those opposed to donation currently
have limited incentive to express their position because non-consent is the
default. Under a presumed consent approach, the family of a decedent who
did not opt out could be confident that she generally supported donation, or
at least was not strongly opposed to it. Under the existing approach, fami-
lies may be hesitant to consent, particularly when family members disagree,
for fear that donation would violate the decedent's wishes.
For consent to legitimately follow from silence, all affected individuals
must be properly advised of their right and opportunity to object, as well as
the necessity of recording such objection. The essential educational cam-
paign may itself produce positive impacts on donation. As individuals and
families discuss the impact of the new system, they may be more likely to
carefully consider their own views and to make their wishes known. This
may increase donation rates, as more discussion within families regarding
donation is associated with higher likelihood of donation.96 Such benefits
may also be derived from a mandated choice system,97 but presumed con-
sent has the benefit of clearly proclaiming that donation is publicly support-
ed, socially beneficial, and the normal course of action absent specific, per-
sonal objection.
The existing opt-in system also suffers from a lack of uniformity. Alt-
hough the legal structure across jurisdictions is consistent,98 the family ap-
proach methodology used by various procurement organizations, in-house
coordinators, and hospital staff is not.99 Different approaches beget different
consent rates, indicating that the opt-in system does not apply equally to all
decedents and their families. For example, health care practitioners who ask
sumed consent donation of corneas). Family members may also claim limited quasi-property
or due process rights in decedents' bodies that poorly constructed presumed consent systems
potentially violate. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding a due
process violation in the removal of decedents' corneas despite widow's stated objection,
where coroner's policy was not to review records for evidence of objection before permitting
procurement).
95. GOSTIN, supra note 55, at 48.
96. Siminoff, supra note 25.
97. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 59, at 180-82; Aaron Spital, Mandated Choice, 273
JAMA 504 (1995).
98. Nationally, forty-six states and the District of Colombia have enacted some form of
the 2006 UAGA. See supra, note 10.
99. Siminoff, supra note at 25.
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about organ donation apologetically or say that they are legally required to
do so receive far more refusals than procurement organization staff specifi-
cally trained in how to approach a family member.'0o The more tactful and
successful approach includes providing more information to the family and
spending more time with the family discussing the issues.101
Many families learn about organ donation for the first time during the
approach for consent. The more surprised a family is about donation when
approached, the more likely they are to refuse. 102 The public education
campaign necessary to implement presumed consent would provide infor-
mation sooner,103 rather than surprising families with complex details dur-
ing a particularly difficult time. This begins the process of fostering a cul-
ture that views donation as the norm, rather than the exception implied by
an opt-in system. Eventually, the decisional inertia that presently works
against donation should abate as donation becomes the more conservative
and commonplace decision.10 This will further relieve the burden on family
members, and may also increase the supply of donor organs and tissues.105
The support provided to families would also change in a presumed con-
sent system. Procurement organization staff are well-trained in how to dis-
cuss donation with family members and provide appropriate support during
and after the donation process. 106 Many health care staff are, as well. But,
generally speaking, staff involved in the consent process are not social
workers, counselors, or mental health professionals,10 7 although procure-
ment organizations do frequently provide families with referrals to such
professionals.108 This is indicative of the proper role for procurement organ-
ization staff as facilitators of all aspects of donation, from consent to pro-
curement to family support. For registered donors, this process works well.
100. Id.
101. Id. The procurement organization approach results in more donations even when
controlling for factors such as initial family reaction. Id.
102. Id. at 74.
103. Organ Donation: Presumed Consent to Start in December 2015, BBC NEws (Sept.
10, 2013, 10:05 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-24032031 ("[Pleople will be
given plenty of information on how the new system works and what their choices are.").
104. See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Mak-
ing, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (asserting that individuals will generally stick with
the status quo when faced with important decisions).
105. See Rosemary A. Robbins, Signing an Organ Donor Card: Psychological Factors,
14 DEATH STUD. 219, 226 (1990) (asserting that psychological stress and physical anxiety
are notably correlated with an unwillingness to donate organs).
106. Liva Jacoby & James Jaccard, Perceived Support Among Families Deciding About
Organ Donation for Their Loved Ones: Donor vs. Nondonor Next of Kin, 19 AM. J. CRITICAL
CARE e52, e53 (2010).
107. Id.
108. E.g., LifeNet Health, How Does the Process Work?, http://1ifenethealthopo.org
/all about donation/how does-the-process-work (last visited May 22, 2014) (outlining do-
nor family support up to eighteen months after donation).
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Staff are able to approach families in a role of providing information and
facilitating the donation process, bringing family members into a positive
discussion about fulfilling the decedent's wishes.109
Where the potential donor is not registered, the consent approach can
take on an unpleasant veneer of salesmanship. Though procurement organi-
zation staff are well-trained to avoid such appearances, health care staff
may not always receive the same training.110 Regardless of the care and tact
of the approach, families may nonetheless feel that staff are "selling" dona-
tion. This may color families' views and negatively affect their relationship
with the procurement organization. An opposite problem may also arise
when approaches are overly cautious and tacit in solicitation of consent,
leading family members to hesitate when uncertain of a decedent's wishes
because donation appears to be the disfavored choice." Presumed consent
would allow staff to discuss donation from the position of facilitator-
rather than salesperson or supplicant-more akin to the approach taken for
registered donors. Although even that relationship is imperfect, as evi-
denced by existing family vetoes,112 it remains generally positive and
should improve further if presumed consent succeeds in altering the cultural
view of donation. Presumed consent would allow procurement organization
staff to do what they do best: offer attentive care and relevant information
to families, assess the medical potential for donation, and facilitate the do-
nation process.
Commenters rightly point to family objection as a primary obstacle to
improving donation rates, and they argue that presumed consent does little
in and of itself to resolve the issue.113 While the impact of presumed con-
sent may not be immediate, it may ultimately be profound. Beyond direct
gains in procurement of suitable donors though an expanded consent pool,
presumed consent offers further gains through the secondary effects of
changing cultural views and norms regarding donation. Current discussion
and promotion of organ and tissue donation focus on "The Gift of Life,"
and emphasize the altruistic nature of consent. This is laudable, accurate,
and entirely appropriate given the current consent structure. A change in
this paradigm from "gift" toward "duty" or at least "moral obligation"
would be even better. Presumed consent may not succeed in shifting the
conversation quite that far, but even a change in what is considered "nor-
mal" would pay significant dividends from a public health perspective and
109. Siminoff, supra note 25, at 74.
110. Jacoby & Jaccard, supra note 106, at 59.
111. See T. Elizabeth Weathersbee & Douglas W. Maynard, Dialing for donations:
practices and actions in the telephone solicitation of human tissues, 31 Soc. HEALTH &
ILLNESS 803, 812-13 (2009).
112. Siminoff, supra note 25, at 74-75.
113. Orentlicher, supra note 6, at 297.
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could serve to change the views of many families in the future. 114 Families
making donation decisions in the absence of a clear expression of the dece-
dent's wishes are understandably prone to cautious and conservative deci-
sion-making. This creates a decisional inertia that amplifies the effect of the
existing rule and limits donation. 15 Changing the default rule shifts the bal-
ance by making donation, rather than non-donation, the conservative
choice. This should also reduce the incidence of families overriding a dece-
dent's clear desire to donate, which has historically been a significant prob-
lem. 16
V. CONCLUSION
The existing opt-in approach to organ and tissue donation in the U.S. is
largely functional, but flawed. The system as it stands leaves too many re-
cipients on waiting lists. It fails to recover tissue from too many willing do-
nors who do not adequately express their preferences. And it unnecessarily
burdens donor families. Transitioning to presumed consent will not correct
all of these shortcomings instantaneously, and it will not solve them by it-
self. But by leveraging the power of default legal rules to change the choice
to donate from the exception to the norm, presumed consent has the poten-
tial to change the way Americans think about donation-a key first step in
improving donation rates for all types of tissue and easing the process for
donor families. Opt-in and opt-out systems both hinge on choice, but the
latter offers numerous public health benefits. The time has come to flip the
switch to "On" for donation.
114. See Eric J. Johnson & Daniel G. Goldstein, Defaults and Donation Decisions, 78
TRANSPLANTATION 1713, 1714-15 (2004) (presenting data that questions phrasing that re-
flects presumed consent was associated with increased willingness to be a donor and com-
paring donation rates between opt-in and opt-out countries).
115. Whyte et al., supra note 7, at 34.
116. Orentlicher, supra note 6, at 312; Bucklin, supra note 3.
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